United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
Honorable Michelle H. Bums, United States Magistrate Judge.
Pending
before the Court is Plaintiff Tammy Lay's appeal from the
Social Security Administration's final decision to deny
her claim for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
security income. The Commissioner has filed a response brief
conceding error by the ALJ, and requesting remand of this
matter for further administrative proceedings pursuant to
sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). After reviewing the
administrative record and the arguments of the parties, the
Court now issues the following ruling.
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff
filed applications for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income pursuant to Titles II and XVI of
the Social Security Act in May 2014, alleging disability
beginning December 31, 2004. These claims were denied
initially and upon reconsideration. After a subsequent
hearing, an ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was
not disabled. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's
request for review, thereby making the ALJ's decision the
final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff sought judicial
review of the ALJ's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
405(g).
In her
Opening Brief, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing
to adequately consider the opinion of Angel Gomez, M.D.
Plaintiff requests that the Court vacate the decision of the
ALJ and remand for a determination of benefits.
In
response, the Commissioner concedes that the ALJ erred in
evaluating Dr. Gomez's opinion, but states that
outstanding issues remain, and the record raises serious
doubt that Plaintiff was, in fact, disabled. Thus, the
Commissioner argues that this case should be remanded for
further administrative proceedings.
Therefore,
the only issue before the Court is whether this matter should
be reversed and remanded for further proceedings or for an
award of benefits.
DISCUSSION
“When
an ALJ's denial of benefits is not supported by the
record, the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is
to remand to the agency for additional investigation or
explanation.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153,
1162 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). The
Court applies the credit-as-true rule to determine that a
claimant is disabled and entitled to an award of benefits
only if there are no “outstanding issues [in the
record] that must be resolved” and “it is clear
from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the
claimant disabled were [the improperly rejected] evidence
credited.” Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172,
1178 (9th Cir. 2000). However, a “claimant
is not entitled to benefits under the statute unless the
claimant is, in fact, disabled, no matter how egregious the
ALJ's errors may be.” Strauss v. Comm'r,
Soc. Sec. Admin., 635 F.3d 1135, 1138 (9th
Cir. 2011). An award of benefits is appropriate only if all
factual issues have been resolved and the record supports a
finding of disability.
In her
brief, Plaintiff states that crediting Dr. Gomez's
limitations would direct a finding of disability under
Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 2. Plaintiff contends that Dr. Gomez limited
Plaintiff to four hours of standing and walking, and argues
that the SSA defines light work as “requires walking or
standing for approximately six hours of the day.”
Therefore, Plaintiff alleges that “this Court can
rightfully conclude that Plaintiff is limited to a sedentary
residual functional capacity with no transferable skills,
unable to perform past work, and should be awarded disability
at borderline age of 49 and 5 months, December 2013.”
On
September 3, 2014, Dr. Gomez examined Plaintiff and completed
a medical source statement of ability to do work-related
activities. As part of his assessment, Dr. Gomez opined that
Plaintiff's limitations in standing and/or walking least
was at least 2 hours but less than 6 hours in an 8 hour day -
and he specifically indicated “Four hours.”
(Transcript of Administrative Record (“Tr.”) at
528.)
Defendant
contends that Dr. Gomez's opinion reflects a restriction
to a reduced range of light level work - not to sedentary
level work. Citing to SSR 83-10, Defendant states that jobs
are sedentary if walking and standing “total no more
than about 2 hours of an 8-hour workday.” SSR 83-10.
“[T]he full range of light work requires standing or
walking, off and on, for a total of approximately 6 hours of
an 8-hour workday.” Id. Defendant further
states that a claimant can have a residual functional
capacity with sitting, standing, and walking limitations
between the sedentary and light levels. See SSR
83-12. Defendant argues that Dr. Gomez's assessment of
four hours of standing/walking in an eight-hour workday
clearly falls between the agency's definitions of
sedentary and light level work.
Having
considered that arguments of the parties, the Court finds
that there are identifiable issues to be resolved on remand.
Although the parties concede, and the record reflects that
the ALJ erred in failing to provide adequate reasons for his
assessment of Dr. Gomez's opinion, the parties have
identified conflicting evidence in the record that precludes
application of the credit-as-true rule, and may support a
non-disability finding. Thus, because there are outstanding
issues to be resolved, the Court will remand for further
administrative proceedings. Specifically, remand is
appropriate for a renewed evaluation of the opinion evidence
of record and reconsideration Plaintiff's residual
functional capacity.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Commissioner's
decision is VACATED and this matter is
REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42
U.S.C. ยง 405(g) for further ...