United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
MARIA
DAVILA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
This
matter is on referral pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the
Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Pending before the Court is
Petitioner Ronald Kelly Young's motion to supplement his
petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 43.) Respondents
partially oppose Young's request to the extent Young
raises an ineffective-assistance claim not alleged in the
original or amended petitions. (Doc. 51.) For the following
reasons, Young's motion will be granted in
full.[1]
I.
Legal Standard
Title
28 U.S.C. § 2242 provides that habeas petitions
“may be amended or supplemented as provided in the
rules of procedure applicable to civil actions.” Thus,
amendments to habeas petitions are analyzed under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15, the rule governing pleading
amendments in civil cases. See Mayle v. Felix, 545
U.S. 644, 655 (2005). Under Rule 15(c), “a petitioner
may add an otherwise untimely claim to her habeas petition if
it relates back to a timely-filed claim.” Alfaro v.
Johnson, 862 F.3d 1176, 1183 (9th Cir. 2017). A claim
relates back if it “ar[ises] out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set out-or attempted to be set
out-in the original pleading.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
15(c)(1)(B). “An amended habeas petition . . . does not
relate back . . . when it asserts a new ground for relief
supported by facts that differ in both time and type from
those the original pleading set forth.” Mayle,
545 U.S. at 650.
II.
Discussion
The
ineffective-assistance claim in dispute is an adjunct to one
of Young's timely filed Brady claims. In his
petitions, Young alleges that the prosecution violated
Brady by withholding the “exculpatory expert
opinion” of FBI Special Agent Kelly Goldsmith. (Doc. 1
at 36-42; Doc. 17-1 at 24-29.) In his supplemental brief,
Young alleges that trial counsel were ineffective for failing
to investigate Agent Goldsmith's work and to ultimately
call Agent Goldsmith to testify as a defense witness. (Doc.
45 at 9.) Respondents argue that this ineffective-assistance
claim was not raised in the original or amended petitions and
must be rejected because it does not relate back to any
timely filed claim. (Doc. 51 at 1-3.) Apparently conceding
that he did not raise the claim earlier, Young contends that
it indeed relates back. (Doc. 52 at 1-3.)
The
Court finds that Young's ineffective-assistance claim is
timely because it relates back to the timely filed original
and amended petitions. The “conduct, transaction, or
occurrence” underlying Young's claim is
straightforward: first, Agent Goldsmith's opinions
rebutted the opinions of the prosecution's expert and
thus were favorable to Young; and, second, trial counsel were
deficient in failing to identify Agent Goldsmith as a
favorable witness and to call Agent Goldsmith at trial. (Doc.
45 at 9.) Young did not sufficiently set forth the foregoing
facts and ground for relief in the original and amended
petitions. However, an amended pleading can also relate back
if it “ar[ises] out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence . . . attempted to be set out in the
original pleading.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(B) (emphasis
added). Young plainly attempted to set out his
ineffective-assistance claim in the original and amended
petitions.
First,
Young raised a factually related Brady claim
(described above). (Doc. 1 at 36-42 (original petition); Doc.
17-1 at 24-29 (amended petition).) Young prefaced his
Brady claims by asserting the claims “also
serve as legal grounds for Young's additional claims of .
. . ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Doc. 1 at 37;
Doc. 17-1 at 24-25.) Second, Young raised various claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, including one based on
trial counsel's alleged failure to investigate his case
adequately, either personally or through supervision of the
defense investigator. (Doc. 1 at 57-58; Doc. 17-1 at 45-46.)
In this broad sub-claim, Young expressly incorporated the
facts from his Brady claim relating to Agent
Goldsmith's exculpatory opinions. (Doc. 1 at 58; Doc.
17-1 at 46.)
These
allegations evince an intent to allege an
ineffective-assistance claim based on counsel's failure
to identify Agent Goldsmith as a favorable defense witness.
Thus, the new ineffective-assistance claim arises from the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence that Young attempted to
set out in the original and amended petitions (not from the
Brady claim Young did set out, as Respondents
argue). As such, the claim is timely.
IT
IS ORDERED that the motion to supplement (Doc. 43)
is granted. The Clerk of Court is directed
to file Petitioner's supplemental memorandum (lodged at
Doc. 45).
IT
IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within 14
days of the date of this Order, Respondents shall
file an answer to Petitioner's new claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Petitioner may file a reply within
7 days of service of the answer. The answer
and reply shall not exceed five pages in length or address
any other issue.
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Notes:
[1] “[A] magistrate judge may hear
and determine nondispositive matters but not dispositive
ones.” Bastidas v. Chappell, 791 F.3d 1155,
1159 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Mitchell v. Valenzuela,
791 F.3d 1166, 1168 (9th Cir. 2015)). The “decision to
grant a motion to amend is not generally
dispositive.” Id. at 1164 (emphasis in
original). ...