United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
Douglas L. Rayes, J.
Plaintiff
applied for disability insurance benefits on August 25, 2014,
alleging disability beginning July 22, 2014. (A.R. 16.) The
claim was denied initially on January 7, 2015, and upon
reconsideration on April 29, 2015. (Id.) Plaintiff
then requested a hearing. (Id.) On March 20, 2017,
Plaintiff, her representative, and a vocational expert (VE)
testified at a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ). (Id. at 37-62.) The ALJ issued a written
decision on June 5, 2017, finding Plaintiff not disabled
within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (Id.
at 16-28.) This became the Commissioner’s final
decision when the Appeals Council denied review.
(Id. at 1-3.)
On June
22, 2018, Plaintiff sought review by this Court. (Doc. 1.)
After receipt of the administrative record (Doc. 11), the
parties fully briefed the issues for review (Docs. 14-16).
For reasons stated below, the Court reverses the
Commissioner’s decision and remands for an award of
benefits.
BACKGROUND
To
determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the
Social Security Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). At the first step, the ALJ
determines whether the claimant is engaging in substantial
gainful activity. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the
claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. At step two,
the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a
“severe” medically determinable physical or
mental impairment. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the
claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. At step three,
the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or
combination of impairments meets or medically equals an
impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Pt.
404. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is
automatically found to be disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds
to step four. At step four, the ALJ assesses the
claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC) and
determines whether the claimant is still capable of
performing past relevant work. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If
so, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. If
not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, where she
determines whether the claimant can perform any other work
based on the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work
experience. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is
not disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.
At step
one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff meets the insured status
requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31,
2018, and that she has not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since July 22, 2014. (A.R. 18.) At step two, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments:
headaches, non-epileptic event disorder, obesity, cognitive
disorder, depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, anxiety
disorder, and panic disorder. (Id.) At step three,
the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s impairments do not
meet or equal the severity of one of the listed impairments
in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404.
(Id. at 19.) At step four, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff:
has the [RFC] to perform a full range of work at all
exertional levels but with the following nonexertional
limitations: the claimant can occasionally balance and climb
ramps or stairs, but can never climb ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds. The claimant can have occasional exposure to
excessively loud noises, can have no exposure to dangerous
machinery with moving mechanical parts, can have no exposure
to unprotected heights, and cannot drive as part of her job.
Mentally, the claimant is limited to tasks that can be
learned by demonstration within thirty days, work that does
not involve fast-paced work requirements, and work involving
minimal, in-person public interaction.
(Id. at 21.) With this RFC in mind, the ALJ
determined that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past
relevant work. (Id. at 26.) Moving to step five, the
ALJ found that there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform
including those of cleaner (DICOT 381.687-022, 1991 WL
673259), kitchen helper (DICOT 318.687-010, 1991 WL 672755),
and hand packager (DICOT 920.587-018, 1991 WL 687916).
(Id. at 28.) Consequently, the ALJ held that
Plaintiff had not been disabled through the date of her
decision. (Id.)
STANDARD
OF REVIEW
It is
not the district court’s role to review the ALJ’s
decision de novo or otherwise determine whether the claimant
is disabled. Rather, the court is limited to reviewing the
ALJ’s decision to determine whether it “contains
legal error or is not supported by substantial
evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630
(9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla but less than a preponderance, and “such
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.
“Where evidence is susceptible to more than one
rational interpretation, the ALJ’s decision should be
upheld.” Id. The court, however, “must
consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm
simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting
evidence.’” Id. Nor may the court
“affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not
rely.” Id.
In
determining whether the ALJ committed legal error, the
district court is bound to apply the legal standards imposed
by the law of this Circuit. This includes the requirement
that, unless contradicted by another physician, if “the
ALJ wishes to disregard the opinion of the treating
physician, he or she must make findings setting forth
specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on
substantial evidence in the record.” Murray v.
Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983).
DISCUSSION
On
appeal, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s decision on two
bases. First, she argues that the ALJ committed reversible
error by failing to analyze Plaintiff’s psychogenic
seizures under Listing 12.07 of the Listing of Impairments
during her step three evaluation. Second, she contends that
the ALJ erred by improperly rejecting the opinions of her
treating physician, Dr. Ronald Bennett, M.D. (Doc. 24 at
10-15.) Having reviewed the record and the parties’
briefs, the Court agrees that the ALJ erred by failing to
evaluate Plaintiff’s psychogenic seizures under Listing
12.07 and by improperly rejecting the medical opinions of
Plaintiff’s treating physician. Although the
ALJ’s failure to assess Plaintiff’s impairments
under Listing 12.07 was harmless, the Court finds the
ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Bennett’s opinions
harmful. Therefore, the ALJ’s decision must be reversed
and remanded for an award of benefits for the reasons
explained below.
I.
The ALJ’s Failure to Evaluate Plaintiff’s
Psychogenic Seizures UnderListing ...