United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
Douglas L. Rayes, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff
Dakota Tidwell seeks judicial review of the Social Security
Administration’s decision to deny his applications for
child disability benefits (“CDB”), disability
insurance benefits (“DIB”), and supplemental
security income (“SSI”). Plaintiff was originally
entitled to childhood SSI benefits based on an application
filed on February 29, 2008. Plaintiff also filed an
application for CDB on July 20, 2012, based on disability
beginning February 29, 2008. However, when Plaintiff reached
18 years of age, the agency reassessed his case under the
adult disability benefit criteria and determined that he was
no longer disabled effective September 8, 2014. (A.R. 61-62.)
Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing before an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”), which took
place on October 28, 2016. (Id. at 39-60.) On
February 8, 2017, the ALJ issued a decision finding that
Plaintiff-despite suffering from severe impairments including
bipolar disorder, pervasive developmental disorder, attention
deficit hyperactive disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder,
and degenerative disc disorder of the lumbar spine-could
perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy. (Id. at 9-22.) Plaintiff argues
that, in denying his application, the ALJ committed
reversible error by giving little weight to the opinions of
his treating psychiatrist, Dr. Sara Gibson, and by improperly
rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony regarding the severity
of his symptoms.
The
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
and reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging
the ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236
F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ’s
determination will be upheld unless it contains harmful legal
error or is not supported by substantial evidence. Orn v.
Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Having
reviewed the parties’ briefs and the administrative
record, the Court affirms.
1. The
ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons, supported by
substantial evidence in the record, for rejecting the
opinions of Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, Dr.
Gibson. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th
Cir. 1995). Dr. Gibson opined that Plaintiff has marked to
extreme limitations in responding appropriately to work
pressures in a usual work setting, moderate to marked
limitations in understanding and remembering detailed
instructions, moderate to marked limitations in making
judgments on simple work-related decisions, moderate to
marked limitations in interacting appropriately with
supervisors, coworkers and the public, and moderate to marked
limitations in responding appropriately to changes in a
routine work setting. (A.R. 590-91, 849-50.) In addition, she
noted that Plaintiff suffers from “[v]ery poor
concentration[, d]ramatic impulsivity [and p]oor ability to
read social cues.” (Id. at 591.) She also
asserted that “when manic or psyschotic[, Plaintiff]
would be totally nonfunctional or able to work for several
weeks.” (Id.) The ALJ discounted these
opinions, explaining that they were contrary to the record.
(Id. at 19.) See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (An ALJ
may discredit the opinion of a treating physician that is
unsupported by the record as a whole). Particularly, the ALJ
highlighted Plaintiff’s self-reports of mere minor
delays from repetitive behaviors and his score of 29/30 on
the Mini Mental Status Exam (“MMSE”) as contrary
to findings of marked limitations in understanding,
remembering, concentrating and judgment-making. See
Bustamamante v. Colvin, No. CV-13-02080-PHX-ESW, 2015 WL
136016, at *6 (D. Ariz. Jan. 9, 2015) (finding that an ALJ
may properly conclude that a high MMSE score indicates a
claimant’s ability to maintain concentration);
Ahmed v. Berryhill, No. CV-17-0573-TUC-BGM, 2019 WL
143465, at *12 (D. Ariz. Mar. 29, 2019) (acknowledging that
an MMS is administered to assess “difficulties with
memory, focus or concentration.”); Hunsaker v.
Berryhill, No. CV-16-08304-PCT-GMS, 2018 WL 1008292, at
*2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 22, 2018) (same). Further, the ALJ
concluded that Dr. Gibson’s opinions were inconsistent
with medical records indicating that Plaintiff’s moods
were good, his anxiety and obsessions were manageable, he was
able to direct his anxiety and hyperactivity into more
positive venues, and his depression, bipolar disorder, and
anxiety were well controlled by medication. (A.R. 19.) The
ALJ’s specific and legitimate rationale for rejecting
Dr. Gibson’s opinions is supported by substantial
evidence. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957
(9th Cir. 2002). Thus, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s
first argument.
2. The
ALJ provided the requisite specific, clear, and convincing
reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony
concerning the severity of his symptoms. See Smolen v.
Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff
testified that he is unable to work due to debilitating
social anxiety and immense difficulty focusing. (A.R. 46.) In
rejecting the purported severity of Plaintiff’s social
anxiety, the ALJ cited to records indicating that Plaintiff
had reported that he had learned ways to keep his anxiety
under control and that his anxiety had improved.
(Id. at 16.) In addition, she noted that Plaintiff
had joined an Ultimate Frisbee team, which he no longer
participates in, not because of social anxiety, but because
the team has not scheduled new events. (Id. at 17.)
Further, she indicated that Plaintiff enjoys volunteering at
his local church. (Id.). See Bray v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227
(9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted) (“In reaching a
credibility determination, an ALJ may weigh inconsistencies
between the claimant’s testimony and his or
her…daily activities”). Next, in making an
adverse credibility determination regarding Plaintiff’s
concentration-related testimony, the ALJ pointed to
Plaintiff’s MMSE score of 29/30, noted that Plaintiff
had briefly worked for his father and grandfather and as a
bagger at a grocery store, and underscored that Plaintiff
performs household chores, cares for his pets, and cooks
simple meals. (A.R. 16-17.) In sum, the ALJ’s
credibility determination was adequately supported by
substantial evidence in the record. Carmickle v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1161-62
(9th Cir. 2008).
Because
the ALJ’s decision is free of harmful legal error and
reasonably supported by the evidence, IT IS
ORDERED that the final decision of the Social
Security Administration is AFFIRMED. The
...