United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
Rosemary Marquez, Judge
Pending
before the Court is Defendant Raul Francisco
Padilla-Delgado's Appeal (Doc. 55) from the Magistrate
Judge's Determination of Commitment (Doc. 39) and the
Magistrate Judge's denial of Defendant's
“Motion for Reconsideration and to Vacate the Order of
Remand” (hereinafter, “Motion to Reconsider and
Vacate Commitment Order”) (Doc. 47). The Court held a
hearing on September 23, 2019 and took the matter under
advisement. (Doc. 59.) For the following reasons, the Appeal
will be denied, except that the Court will alter the
Magistrate Judge's Order of Commitment to specify that
Defendant shall be committed to the custody of the Attorney
General to be hospitalized in a suitable facility for a
period of time not to exceed two months.
I.
Background
Defendant
Padilla-Delgado was indicted on May 17, 2017 on four counts
related to the possession and importation of methamphetamine.
(Doc. 12.) According to the Complaint, when Defendant sought
to enter the United States from Mexico at the DeConcini Port
of Entry in Nogales, Arizona, Border Patrol agents noticed an
“abnormal bulge” in his pants. (Doc. 1.) A
subsequent search revealed two packages of narcotics weighing
approximately 1.42 kilograms in total. (Id.) After
waiving his Miranda rights, Defendant stated that it
was his first time attempting to smuggle narcotics across the
border, that he did it out of financial need and because he
was hungry, and that he did not know how much he was going to
be paid for the smuggling. (Id.)
Defense
counsel filed a Sealed Motion for Competency Evaluation on
February 25, 2019. (Doc. 29.) On February 26, 2019,
Magistrate Judge Ferraro ordered a competency evaluation with
licensed psychiatrist Dr. Marisa Menchola. (Doc. 31.) On June
20, 2019, the Magistrate Judge found that Defendant was not
competent. (Doc. 35.) On June 26, 2019, Defendant was ordered
“committed to the custody of the Attorney General to be
hospitalized in a suitable facility for a reasonable period
of time” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)
(“Commitment Order”). (Doc. 39.) Defendant filed
a motion to stay the Commitment Order and a hearing was held
on June 26, 2019, at which time Magistrate Judge Ferraro
stayed the Commitment Order for one week. (Docs. 40, 41.)
Defendant filed the Motion to Reconsider and Vacate
Commitment Order on July 3, 2019. (Doc. 47.) The Government
opposed the Motion (Doc. 49) and Defendant replied (Doc. 53).
On August 6, 2019, Magistrate Judge Ferraro denied
Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and Vacate Commitment
Order but continued to stay the Commitment Order to allow
time for the filing of a Notice of Appeal. (Doc. 54.) The
Notice of Appeal was filed on August 8, 2019. (Doc. 55.)
II.
Applicable Law
Under
18 U.S.C. § 4241(d), if a court finds by a preponderance
of the evidence that a defendant is incompetent to stand
trial, “the court shall commit the defendant to the
custody of the Attorney General, ” who “shall
hospitalize the defendant for treatment in a suitable
facility . . .” for a “reasonable period of time,
not to exceed four months, ” to determine whether there
is a “substantial probability” that the defendant
will regain competency to stand trial “in the
foreseeable future.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1).
Additionally,
the defendant will be committed to the custody of the AG for
an “additional reasonable period of time . . .”
until either “the court finds . . . a substantial
probability that . . . [the defendant] will attain capacity .
. .” or the charges are disposed of, whichever is
earlier. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2).
“The
statutory scheme established by Congress clearly mandates
that a defendant found to be incompetent be placed in a
mental hospital for observation.” United States v.
Shawar, 865 F.2d 856, 859 (7th Cir. 1989); see also
United States v. Sherman, 722 F.Supp. 504, 505-6 (N.D.
Ill. 1989), aff'd, 912 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1990)
(court has “no choice” but to commit defendant to
the custody of the AG); United States v. Lewis, 5
F.Supp.3d 515, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding commitment
mandatory); United States v. Stanford, 769 F.Supp.2d
1083 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (same). The “likelihood of
recovery is not . . . to be considered by the district court
in deciding whether to commit the defendant for the
evaluation period.” Shawar, 865 F.2d at 861.
“The statute makes it clear . . . that once a defendant
is found incompetent, the Government is entitled to an
in-depth evaluation of him . . .” Id.
Temporary commitment of an incompetent defendant to determine
whether he will attain capacity within a reasonable period
does not violate due process. Id. at 864; cf.
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 733 (1972) (indefinite
commitment of incompetent criminal defendant violated due
process and equal protection).
In
United States v. Strong, the Defendant argued that
§ 4241(d) was unconstitutional because it
“requires mandatory confinement without giving the
district court an opportunity to assess a defendant's
individualized circumstances.” 489 F.3d 1055, 1057 (9th
Cir. 2007). He also asserted that § 4241(d) violated his
fundamental liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.
Strong, 489 F.3d at 1060-61. Relying heavily on the
Supreme Court's decision in Jackson, the Ninth
Circuit found that, because “commitment under §
4241(d) is both limited in duration and reasonably
related” to the purpose for confinement, it is
constitutional. Strong, 489 F.3d at 1063;
Jackson, 406 U.S. 715. Crucially, the
Strong court also determined that even if a
defendant appears non-restorable to competency prior to being
committed, that fact does not preclude or undermine the need
to commit the defendant. Strong, 489 F.3d at 1062.
Such an argument “presumes an answer to the precise
question to be determined through § 4241(d)
commitment.” Strong, 489 F.3d at 1062. The
very purpose of the mandatory detention provision is to
provide for a more thorough and accurate determination of
restorability than could be achieved through a brief
interview and medical record reviews. Strong, 489
F.3d at 1062.
Section
4241(d) limits mandatory commitment to a “reasonable
period of time.” See United States v. Smith,
764 F.Supp.2d 541 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). In Smith, the
defendant was found incompetent and the court ordered him
committed pursuant to § 4241(d). Smith, 764
F.Supp.2d at 542. However, rather than hospitalizing the
defendant for treatment in a suitable facility, the AG
detained defendant in a local jail where he was kept in
isolation and received no treatment or examination for ten
weeks. Id. at 543, 545. In applying § 4241(d)
to this situation, the court found that the statute did not
explicitly limit the time period for a defendant's
commitment to the custody of the Attorney General-it limited
only the period of hospitalization, to a maximum of four
months. Id. at 544-45. Out of concern that such an
application of § 4241(d) would likely be
unconstitutional, the court applied the rule of
constitutional avoidance to construe § 4241(d) to also
limit commitment to the custody of the AG to a reasonable
period of time. Id. at 545.
III.
Discussion
Upon
review of the parties' arguments and applicable law, the
Court finds that the commitment of an incompetent defendant
to the custody of the AG is mandatory pursuant to §
4241(d). The Court lacks the discretion to determine that a
presumably or arguably non-restorable defendant need not be
committed. Furthermore, the Court is unpersuaded by
Defendant's arguments that a temporary commitment,
limited to a reasonable period of time for the purposes
outlined in § 4241(d), is unconstitutional.
In the
present case, a court-appointed licensed psychologist, whose
qualifications the parties do not dispute, concluded that
Defendant is “not restorable to competency.”
(Doc. 36 at 6.) Given the evaluation that has already been
completed, the Court finds that two months is a reasonable
period of time for ...