United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
HONORABLE DIANE J. HUMETEWA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
At
issue is the denial of Plaintiff Geread Forman's
Application for Supplemental Security Income Benefits by the
Social Security Administration (“SSA”) under the
Social Security Act (“the Act”). Plaintiff filed
a Complaint (Doc. 1) with this Court seeking judicial review
of that denial, and the Court now addresses Plaintiff's
Opening Brief (Doc. 11, “Pl. Br.”), Defendant
Social Security Administration Commissioner's Response
Brief (Doc. 14, “Def. Br.”), and Plaintiff's
Reply Brief (Doc. 15, “Reply”). The Court has
reviewed the briefs and Administrative Record (Doc. 10,
“R.”) and now reverses the Administrative Law
Judge's decision (R. at 14-36) as upheld by the Appeals
Council (R. at 1-6).
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
filed an application for Supplemental Security Income
Benefits on April 8, 2014 for a period of disability
beginning on March 26, 2014. (R. at 17.) Plaintiff previously
filed an application for Supplemental Security Income
Benefits that was denied by an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) on May 22, 2010. (R. at 85-102.)
Plaintiff's present claim was initially denied on August
13, 2014 and was denied again upon reconsideration on
September 25, 2015. (R. at 17.) On May 2, 2016, Plaintiff
appeared and testified before the ALJ for a hearing on his
claim. (R. at 17.) The ALJ denied his claim on May 30, 2018.
(R. at 14-36.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's
request for review of the ALJ's decision. (R. at 1-6.) On
October 5, 2018, Plaintiff filed this action seeking judicial
review of the denial. (Doc. 1.)
The
Court has reviewed the medical evidence in its entirety and
finds it unnecessary to provide a complete summary here. The
pertinent medical evidence will be discussed in addressing
the issues raised by the parties. In short, upon considering
the medical records and opinions, the ALJ evaluated
Plaintiff's disability based on the following alleged
impairments: spine disorders, disorders of the muscle,
post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar affective disorder,
personality disorder, and polysubstance dependence. (R. at
20.)
Ultimately,
the ALJ evaluated the medical evidence and testimony and
concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled. (R. at 28.) The ALJ
determined that Plaintiff “does not have an impairment
or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals
the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R.
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” (R. at 20.) The ALJ
found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to perform “light work, ”
except that Plaintiff “could occasionally climb
stairs/ramps, balance, stoop, kneel[, ] crouch and crawl. He
is unable to climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. In addition,
he needs to avoid frequent contact with [the] public,
co-workers and supervisors and is limited to simple unskilled
work.” (R. at 21.) Consequently, the ALJ concluded that
“there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in
the national economy that the [Plaintiff] can perform.”
(R. at 27.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
In
determining whether to reverse an ALJ's decision, the
district court reviews only those issues raised by the party
challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236
F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court may set aside
the Commissioner's disability determination only if the
determination is not supported by substantial evidence or is
based on legal error. Orn, 495 F.3d at 630.
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than
a preponderance; it is relevant evidence that a reasonable
person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion
considering the record as a whole. Id. To determine
whether substantial evidence supports a decision, the court
must consider the record as a whole and may not affirm simply
by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting
evidence.” Id. Generally, “[w]here the
evidence is susceptible to more than one rational
interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ's decision,
the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v.
Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted).
To
determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the
Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of proof on the
first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner
at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098
(9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines
whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial
gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so,
the claimant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends.
Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the
claimant has a “severe” medically determinable
physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled, and
the inquiry ends. Id. At step three, the ALJ
considers whether the claimant's impairment or
combination of impairments meets or medically equals an
impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R.
Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the
claimant is automatically found to be disabled. Id.
If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. Id. At step
four, the ALJ assesses the claimant's RFC and determines
whether the claimant is still capable of performing past
relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so,
the claimant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends.
Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final
step, where she determines whether the claimant can perform
any other work in the national economy based on the
claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not
disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled.
Id.
III.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff
raises a pair of arguments which challenge the ALJ's
consideration of medical opinions offered by Plaintiff's
medical providers. (Pl. Br. at 5.) First, Plaintiff argues
that the ALJ erred by giving minimal weight to the opinion of
Dr. Dan Muschevici, Plaintiff's treating psychiatrist.
(R. at 9.) Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by
giving minimal weight to the opinion of Hazel Mahatha,
Plaintiff's board-certified psychiatric nurse
practitioner. (R. at 6.) The Court agrees with Plaintiff. The
ALJ erred in rejecting the opinions of Dr. Muschevici and Ms.
Mahatha. Consequently, substantial evidence does not support
the ALJ's non-disability determination and it must be
reversed.
While
“[t]he ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence,
” there is a hierarchy among the sources of medical
opinions. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041
(9th Cir. 2008). Those who have treated a claimant are
treating physicians, those who examined but did not treat the
claimant are examining physicians, and those who neither
examined nor treated the claimant are nonexamining
physicians. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th
Cir. 1995). “The medical opinion of a claimant's
treating physician is given ‘controlling weight' so
long as ‘it is well-supported by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not
inconsistent with other substantial evidence in [the
record].”' Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d
664, 675 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(2)). If a treating physician's opinion is not
given controlling weight, then the ALJ must consider the
relevant factors listed in 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(d)(2)-(6) and determine the appropriate weight to
give the opinion. Orn, 495 F.3d at 632.
If a
treating physician's opinion is contradicted by another
doctor's opinion, the ALJ cannot reject the treating
physician's opinion without “setting forth
specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on
substantial evidence in the record.” Murray v.
Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983). A treating
physician's opinion will often be entitled to significant
deference, even when contradicted. Orn, 495 F.3d at
632-33. An ALJ may not reject a treating doctor's opinion
with boilerplate assertions or illusory contradictions
between doctors based on isolated reports rather than the
record as a whole. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995,
1012-14 (9th Cir. 2014).
Treating
nurse-practitioners are not afforded the same weight as
treating physicians under the regulations. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1513(d) (2014). Instead nurse-practitioners are
classified as an “other medical source.”
Id. To reject a treating nurse-practitioner's
opinion the ALJ must provide germane reasons ...