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Al Saud v. Arpaio

United States District Court, D. Arizona

October 23, 2019

Shaykh Muhammad Abdul Aziz Klalid Bin Talal Al Saud, Plaintiff,
Joseph M. Arpaio, et al., Defendants.


          Honorable Steven P. Logan United States District Judge

         Plaintiff Shaykh Muhammad Abdul Aziz Klalid Bin Talal Al Saud, who is currently confined in Arizona State Prison Complex-Eyman, brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 21.) Defendants move for summary judgment, and Plaintiff did not file a response.[1] (Docs. 85.) The Court subsequently ordered Plaintiff to show cause why this action should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute (Doc. 91) and Plaintiff did not respond.

         I. Background

         In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff relevantly alleged as follows. On September 29, 2016, Plaintiff was taken into the custody of the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) and incarcerated in the Fourth Avenue Jail. (Doc. 21 at 4.) On his arrival, Plaintiff submitted a dietary request to Defendant Millard, the Commander of Religious Services, requesting an Islamic-Halal diet due to Plaintiff religious beliefs that requires him to eat Halal food prepared in the name of Allah and to not eat “unhealthy unclean foods” not prepared in the name of Allah. (Id. at 4-7.) Plaintiff told Millard and Defendants Ogar and Herrera that the MSCO's vegetarian diet did not meet his needs because it was not prepared in the name of Allah. (Id.) There were also “rotten spoil [sic] maggots moldy bread and fruit items” that “don't meet [Plaintiff's] dietary laws.”

         On screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court determined that Plaintiff stated a First Amendment free exercise claim, a claim pursuant to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), and a Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim against Defendants Millard, Herrera, and Ogar. (Doc. 25.) The Court dismissed the remaining claims and Defendants. (Id.) Defendant Millard was subsequently dismissed pursuant to a Stipulation. (Doc. 75.)

         II. Failure to Prosecute

         Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Court's Order to show cause. Although Plaintiff has filed notices indicating that he is not receiving some legal paperwork from certain Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) officials, Plaintiff has repeatedly violated the Court's orders regarding seeking appropriate relief regarding his problems with legal paperwork. (See Docs. 92-95.) Moreover, Plaintiff's allegations regarding not receiving his legal paperwork are generally conclusory, Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence that he has grieved any issue regarding failure to obtain legal paperwork as this Court previously instructed, and this Court does not have jurisdiction over the ADC or any ADC officials in this action.

         Accordingly, Plaintiff's failure to comply with the Court's orders and failure to show cause for his failure to do so compels the conclusion that this action should be dismissed for failure to prosecute. See Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986) (In determining whether Plaintiff's failure to prosecute warrants dismissal of the case, the Court must weigh the following five factors: “(1) the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.”).

         Alternatively, the Court will address the merits of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

         III. Summary Judgment Standard

         A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

         If the movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmovant need not produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 250 (1986); see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor, First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968); however, it must “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

         At summary judgment, the judge's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court must believe the nonmovant's evidence and draw all inferences in the nonmovant's favor. Id. at 255. The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider any other materials in the record. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3).

         IV. Facts

         Plaintiff was in the custody of the MCSO between September 29, 2016 and April 20, 2017, and was again booked into MSCO custody on October 12, 2017. (Doc. 86 ¶¶ 1, 2.)[2] Plaintiff believes he may only consume foods prepared by sincere Muslims in the name of God and he must consume Halal meat. (Id. ΒΆ 3.) According to Plaintiff, for food to ...

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