United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
HONORABLE SUSAN M. BRNOVICH UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
At
issue is the denial of Plaintiff Ivy Johnson's
Application for Disability Insurance Benefits by the Social
Security Administration (SSA) under the Social Security Act.
Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1), and an Amended
Complaint (Doc. 14), with this Court seeking judicial review
of that denial, and the Court now addresses Plaintiff's
Opening Brief (Doc. 24, Pl. Br.), Defendant Social Security
Administration Commissioner's Response Brief (Doc. 28,
Def. Br.), and Plaintiff's Reply Brief (Doc. 29, Reply).
The Court has reviewed the briefs and Administrative Record
(Doc. 18, R.) and now affirms the Administrative Law
Judge's decision (R. at 15-33) as upheld by the Appeals
Council (R. at 1-6).
I.BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits on
February 21, 2012 for a period of disability beginning on
February 17, 2011. (R. at 67.) On January 23, 2013, Plaintiff
appeared and testified before an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ). (R. at 99.) The ALJ denied her claim but the Appeals
Council remanded the case for a reassessment of
Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC) showing
full consideration of Plaintiff's mental impairments. (R.
at 119.) Plaintiff's second hearing before the ALJ was on
October 18, 2016. (R. at 15.) The same ALJ denied her claim
on January 4, 2017. On November 17, 2017, the Appeals Council
denied Plaintiff's Request for Review of the ALJ's
decision. (R. at 1.)
The
Court has reviewed the medical evidence in its entirety and
finds it unnecessary to provide a complete summary here. The
pertinent medical evidence will be discussed in addressing
the issues raised by the parties. At the second hearing, upon
considering the medical records and opinions, the ALJ
evaluated Plaintiff's disability based on the following
severe impairments: cardiac arrhythmia with pacemaker implant
and hypertension. (R. at 20.) Unlike at the first hearing,
the ALJ did not consider Plaintiff's affective disorder a
severe impairment. (R. at 20, 101.)
Ultimately,
the ALJ evaluated the medical evidence and testimony and
concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled. (R. at 27.) The ALJ
determined that Plaintiff “does not have an impairment
or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals
the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R.
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” (R. at 22.) The ALJ
found that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform “light
work, ” except that she would be prevented from
“climbing ladders, ropes or scaffolds, frequent
climbing ramps and stairs and frequent balancing, stooping,
kneeling, crouching, and crawling.” (R. at 22.)
Furthermore, the ALJ found that Plaintiff should not be
exposed to “dust, fumes, gases, or other respiratory
irritants, ” and that she has “the ability to
understand, remember and carry out detailed
instructions.” (R. at 22.) Consequently, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff “was capable of performing
past relevant work as a social worker and social worker
(mental).” (R. at 26.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
In
determining whether to reverse an ALJ's decision, the
district court reviews only those issues raised by the party
challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236
F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court may set aside
the Commissioner's disability determination only if the
determination is not supported by substantial evidence or is
based on legal error. Orn, 495 F.3d at 630.
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than
a preponderance; it is relevant evidence that a reasonable
person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion
considering the record as a whole. Id. To determine
whether substantial evidence supports a decision, the court
must consider the record as a whole and may not affirm simply
by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting
evidence.” Id. Generally, “[w]here the
evidence is susceptible to more than one rational
interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ's decision,
the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v.
Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted).
To
determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the
Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of proof on the
first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner
at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098
(9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines
whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial
gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so,
the claimant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends.
Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the
claimant has a “severe” medically determinable
physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled, and
the inquiry ends. Id. At step three, the ALJ
considers whether the claimant's impairment or
combination of impairments meets or medically equals an
impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R.
Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the
claimant is automatically found to be disabled. Id.
If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. Id. At step
four, the ALJ assesses the claimant's RFC and determines
whether the claimant is still capable of performing past
relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so,
the claimant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends.
Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final
step, where she determines whether the claimant can perform
any other work in the national economy based on the
claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not
disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled.
Id.
III.ANALYSIS
Plaintiff
raises three arguments for the Court's consideration.
(Pl. Br. at 1.) First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by
giving minimal weight to the opinion of Dr. Kevin Berman,
Plaintiff's treating cardiologist. (Pl. Br. at 1.) Next,
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly weighed medical
opinions concerning Plaintiff's mental impairments. (Pl.
Br. at 1.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not
properly credit Plaintiff's testimony regarding the
severity of her symptoms. (Pl. Br. at 1.) The Court disagrees
with all three of Plaintiff's arguments. To the extent
the ALJ erred, such error was harmless because substantial
evidence supports the ALJ's non-disability determination.
A.
The ALJ did not err by giving Dr. Berman's opinion
minimal weight.
While
“[t]he ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence,
” there is a hierarchy among the sources of medical
opinions. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041
(9th Cir. 2008). Those who have treated a claimant are
treating physicians, those who examined but did not treat the
claimant are examining physicians, and those who neither
examined nor treated the claimant are nonexamining
physicians. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th
Cir. 1995). “The medical opinion of a claimant's
treating physician is given ‘controlling weight' so
long as ‘it is well-supported by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not
inconsistent with other substantial evidence in [the
record].”' Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d
664, 675 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(2)). If a treating physician's opinion is not
given controlling weight, then the ALJ must consider the
relevant factors listed in 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(d)(2)-(6) and determine the appropriate weight to
give the opinion. Orn, 495 F.3d at 632. However, if
a treating physician's opinion is contradicted by another
doctor's opinion, the ALJ can reject the treating
physician's opinion by “setting forth specific,
legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on substantial
evidence in the record.” Murray v. Heckler,
722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983).
On
August 5, 2011, Dr. Berman completed an Attending
Physician's Statement of Disability for Plaintiff. (R. at
338.) Dr. Berman diagnosed Plaintiff with syncope,
hypertension, left bundle branch block, and symptoms of
vertigo. (R. at 338.) He opined that Plaintiff had various
functional limitations including, an ability to sit, stand,
and walk for only one hour per day. (R. at 338.) He also
found that Plaintiff could occasionally bend, stoop, climb,
push, pull, lift, and ...