United States District Court, D. Arizona
Dominic W. Lanza United States District Judge
before the Court is Plaintiff Alfred E Caraffa's
Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2),
which the Court hereby grants. The Court will screen
Caraffa's complaint (Doc. 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2) before it is allowed to be served.
Pursuant to that screening, the complaint will be dismissed.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), a complaint is subject to
dismissal if it contains claims that are “frivolous or
malicious, ” that “fail to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, ” or that “seek
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” Id. Additionally, under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id.
Although Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations,
“it demands more than an unadorned,
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.'” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is
plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task
that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.
Thus, although a plaintiff's specific factual allegations
may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must
assess whether there are other “more likely
explanations” for a defendant's conduct.
Id. at 681.
Ninth Circuit has instructed that courts must “construe
pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v.
Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A
“complaint [filed by a pro se litigant]
‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Id.
(quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(per curiam)). Conclusory and vague allegations, however,
will not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th
Cir. 1982). A liberal interpretation may not supply essential
elements of the claim that were not initially pled.
a pleading can be cured by the allegation of other facts, a
pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to
amend before the final dismissal of the action.”
Ball v. Cty. of Maricopa, 2017 WL 1833611, *1 (D.
Ariz. 2017) (concluding that complaint could not be amended
to state a cognizable claim and dismissing with prejudice).
sued four defendants: (1) Taco Bell Cantina, (2) Phoenix
Police Officer Ramos (#08017), (3) Phoenix Police Officer
Lenguyen (#06445), and (4) John Doe, the manager of the Taco
Bell Cantina in Collier Center (201 W. Washington St.).
facts alleged by Caraffa, in their entirety, are as follows:
[W]as trespassed [sic] by Phoenix police from Taco Bell
Cantina for panhandling on the public sidewalk[.] [I] later
entered Taco Bell [and was] told by the manager I could
order, [b]ut had to leave[.] I stated his [a]ction[s] were
[b]ases for civil lawsuits[.] [The manager] called the police
[a]fter I left the business [and] made my way to
2nd and Washington train station.
(Doc. 1 at 4.)
included in his complaint a Phoenix Police Department
“traffic ticket and complaint, ” dated October
25, 2019, issued by Officers Ramos and Lenguyen, charging
Caraffa with “3rd degree trespass - real
property” in violation of A.R.S. §
13-1502(A)(1). (Doc. 1 at 7.) The ticket informed
Caraffa that he must appear at Phoenix Municipal Court on
November 4, 2019, at 2:00 p.m. (Id.)
jurisdictional section of the pro se complaint form requiring
the plaintiff to “[l]ist the specific federal statues,
federal treaties, and/or provisions of the United States
Constitution that are at issue in this case, ” Caraffa
wrote: “Due process, [a]buse of [p]ower[, ]
[h]arassment of sexual orientation, discrimination of sexual
orientation under [F]irst Amendment[, ] making false
statements to ...