United States District Court, D. Arizona
Sheila T. Roundtree, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
Maricopa County Special Health District Board of Directors, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Honorable Deborah M. Fine United States Magistrate Judge
TO THE
HONORABLE STEPHEN M. MCNAMEE, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE:
This
matter is before the Court on its own review. After the
filing of a Complaint (Doc. 1), all Plaintiffs consented to
proceeding before a United States Magistrate Judge (Doc. 8).
Initially, Plaintiff Sheila Roundtree was the only plaintiff
who filed an Application to Proceed in District Court Without
Prepaying Fees or Costs (Doc. 2). There were further filings
thereafter, including by Plaintiff Sheila Roundtree who is
not an attorney but was trying to appear on behalf of herself
and other plaintiffs (see Doc. 15).
On
October 7, 2019, this Court issued an Order which addressed
the impropriety of a non-attorney appearing for other parties
in this action:
It appears that the motion (Doc. 15) was prepared by
Plaintiff Sheila Roundtree, see return address on
first page of motion indicating “in propria
persona” (Id.). It does not appear that Sheila
Roundtree is a lawyer. Although a nonattorney may appear
in propria persona in his own behalf, that privilege
is personal to him. McShane v. United States, 366
F.2d 286, 288 (9th Cir. 1966). “He has no
authority to appear as an attorney for others than
himself.” Id. See also C.E. Pope Equity Trust v.
U.S., 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987).
Section 1654, 28 U.S.C., provides that in federal court,
“parties may plead and conduct their own cases
personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts,
respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes
therein.” Significant is the language contained in the
statute that limits the authorization of civil litigants to
“plead and conduct their own cases
personally.” (emphasis added). Courts have
routinely adhered to the general rule prohibiting plaintiffs
appearing in propria persona from pursuing claims on behalf
of others in a representative capacity. Any further filings
will only be considered as to each Plaintiff who signed the
filing.
(Doc. 16 at 1-2). The same Order addressed proceeding without
prepaying costs and fees; the Court wrote:
On August 27, 2019, this Court denied without prejudice the
application to proceed without prepaying costs and fees filed
solely by Plaintiff Sheila Roundtree because the affidavit
sought waiver of the filing fee for all the named Plaintiffs
(Doc. 10). No. applications to proceed without prepaying
costs and fees have been filed by any other Plaintiff besides
Plaintiff Sheila Roundtree. In the motion to extend time for
service, Plaintiffs state that the filing fee will be paid by
October 23, 2019 (Doc. 15). Thus, the filing fee must be paid
in full or applications to proceed without prepaying costs
and fees by each Plaintiff seeking to proceed with the
Complaint or First Amended Complaint must be filed by October
23, 2019. The case will be dismissed as to any Plaintiff not
found to be entitled to proceed without the prepayment of
costs and fees if the filing fee is not paid in full by
October 23, 2019. For purposes of such, the Court will
consider, as to Plaintiff Sheila M. Roundtree, the
application already filed at Doc. 2, from which the Court
intends to find that Plaintiff qualifies for proceeding
without the prepayment of costs and fees.
(Doc. 16 at 2).
On
October 22, 2019, a First Amended Complaint signed by Sheila
Roundtree and Sean Roundtree was filed (Doc. 17). Sean
Roundtree also filed an Application to Proceed in District
Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Doc. 18). Given the
Plaintiffs' consents to proceed before a United States
Magistrate Judge (Doc. 8), undersigned has authority to rule
on the Applications to Proceed in the District Court Without
Prepaying Fees or Costs (Docs. 2, 18), and has granted such
applications (Doc. 21). Without consents to proceed before a
United States Magistrate Judge by all the defendants,
undersigned lacks authority to screen the First Amended
Complaint with the issuance of an order, and will instead
proceed by report and recommendation herein. See Williams
v. King, 875 F.3d 500 (9thCir. 2017).
I.
Screening/Review Pursuant to § 1915
Where a
plaintiff is found to be indigent under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(1) and is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis,
courts must engage in screening and dismiss any claims which:
(1) are frivolous or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on
which relief may be granted; or (3) seek monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B); see Marks v. Solcum, 98 F.3d 494, 495
(9th Cir. 1996). See also Lopez v. Smith,
203 F.3d 1122, 1126 fn. 7 (9th Cir. 2000) (28
U.S.C. § 1915(e) “applies to all in forma pauperis
complaints, ” not merely those filed by prisoners).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ.
P.”) 8(a)(2) provides that a pleading must contain a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” A complaint that
lacks such statement fails to state a claim and must be
dismissed.
In
determining whether a plaintiff fails to state a claim, the
court assumes that all factual allegations in the complaint
are true. Parks Sch. of Bus. v. Symington, 51 F.3d
1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). However, “the
tenet that a court must accept a complaint's allegations
as true is inapplicable to legal conclusions [and] mere
conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The pertinent
question is whether the factual allegations, assumed to be
true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570).
Where a
complaint contains the factual elements of a cause, but those
elements are scattered throughout the complaint without any
meaningful organization, the complaint does not set forth a
“short and plain statement of the claim” for
purposes of Rule 8, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 640
(9th Cir. 1988). Further, a complaint may be
dismissed where it lacks a cognizable legal theory, lacks
sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory, or
contains allegations disclosing some absolute defense or bar
to recovery. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police
Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988);
Weisbuch v. County of L.A., 119 F.3d 778, 783, fn. 1
(9th Cir. 1997).
To
survive dismissal, a complaint must give each defendant
“fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)
(citation omitted). In the absence of fair notice, a
defendant “should not be required to expend legal
resources to guess which claims are asserted against her or
to defend all claims ‘just in case.'”
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