United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
Honorable Eileen S. Willett, United States Magistrate Judge
On
September 26, 2019, the Court issued an Order reversing the
Social Security Administration's (“Social
Security”) denial of Plaintiff's application for
disability insurance benefits and remanding the matter to the
Commissioner of Social Security for an immediate award of
benefits. (Doc. 16). Pending before the Court is the
Commissioner's “Motion to Alter or Amend the
Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e)” (Doc. 18). Plaintiff has filed a Response (Doc.
19), and the Commissioner has filed a Reply (Doc. 20).
Under
Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party
may file a “motion to alter or amend a judgment.”
The Ninth Circuit has explained that
[s]ince specific grounds for a motion to amend or alter are
not listed in the rule, the district court enjoys
considerable discretion in granting or denying the
motion.” McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253,
1255 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (per curiam) (internal
quotation marks omitted). But amending a judgment after its
entry remains “an extraordinary remedy which should be
used sparingly.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). In general, there are four basic grounds upon which
a Rule 59(e) motion may be granted: (1) if such motion is
necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon
which the judgment rests; (2) if such motion is necessary to
present newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence;
(3) if such motion is necessary to prevent manifest
injustice; or (4) if the amendment is justified by an
intervening change in controlling law. Id.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111
(9th Cir. 2011). Rule 59(e) “may not be used to
relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present
evidence that could have been made prior to the entry of
judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554
U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008) (citation omitted). A Rule 59(e)
“motion is not a substitute for appeal and does not
allow the unhappy litigant to reargue the case.”
Bollenbacher v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 621
F.Supp.2d 497, 501 (N.D. Ohio 2008).
In its
September 26, 2019 Order, the Court concluded that the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) discounted
Plaintiff's symptom testimony without providing specific
and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence.
(Doc. 16 at 6-10). The Commissioner asserts that the Court
committed clear error by remanding the matter for an award of
benefits instead of further proceedings. (Doc. 18). According
to the Commissioner, the Court failed to adequately analyze
whether there are any outstanding issues on which further
administrative proceedings would be useful. (Id. at
4-5). The Commissioner does not argue that the record is
incomplete. Instead, the Commissioner argues that there are a
number of inconsistencies in the record that should be
addressed by the ALJ. (Id. at 5-7). The Court
affirms its implicit finding that the record in this matter
is fully developed.[1] “Given this fully developed record,
the admission of more evidence would not be
‘enlightening,' Treichler, 775 F.3d at
1101, and ‘remand for the purpose of allowing the ALJ
to have a mulligan [does not qualify] as a remand for a
‘useful purpose,' Garrison, 759 F.3d at
1021.” Henderson v. Berryhill, 691 Fed.Appx.
384, 386 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Treichler v. Comm'r
of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2014)
and Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1021 (9th Cir.
2014)). Further, although there may be some doubt in the
record as to whether Plaintiff is disabled, the Court affirms
its finding that there is not “serious doubt.”
(Doc. 16 at 11). Because (i) the ALJ failed to provide
legally sufficient reasons for discounting Plaintiffs symptom
testimony, (ii) the record is fully developed and there are
no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a
disability determination can be made (i.e. further
administrative proceedings would not be useful), (iii)
crediting Plaintiffs testimony as true would require the ALJ
to find Plaintiff disabled on remand, and (iv) there is not
“serious doubt” as to whether Plaintiff is
disabled, the Court did not commit clear error by exercising
its discretion to remand this case for an award of benefits.
See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020 (noting that the
Ninth Circuit has “stated or implied that it would be
an abuse of discretion for a district court not to remand for
an award of benefits when all of these conditions are
met”). The Court concludes that he Commissioner has not
presented a valid basis for granting Rule 59(e) relief.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED denying the
Commissioner's “Motion to Alter or Amend the
Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e)” (Doc. 18).
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Notes:
[1] This finding is implicit in the
Court's statement “After examining the record, the
Court finds no outstanding issues of fact to be resolved
through further ...