United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
DOMINIC W. LANZA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
At
issue is the denial of Plaintiff Sabah Albanaa's
Application for Supplemental Security Income Benefits by the
Social Security Administration (“SSA”) under the
Social Security Act (“the Act”). Plaintiff filed
a Complaint (Doc. 1) with this Court seeking judicial review
of that denial, and the Court now addresses Plaintiff's
Opening Brief (Doc. 14, “Pl. Br.”), Defendant
Social Security Administration Commissioner's Response
Brief (Doc. 15, “Def. Br.”), and Plaintiff's
Reply Brief (Doc. 16, “Reply”). The Court has
reviewed the briefs and Administrative Record (Doc. 11,
“R.”) and now affirms the Administrative Law
Judge's decision (R. at 14-34) as upheld by the Appeals
Council (R. at 1-8).[1]
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff
filed an application for Supplemental Security Income
Benefits on March 24, 2014 for a period of disability
beginning on January 24, 2014. (R. at 17.) Plaintiff's
claim was initially denied on May 23, 2014 and was denied
again upon reconsideration on November 13, 2014. (R. at 17.)
On August 9, 2016, Plaintiff appeared and testified before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) for a hearing on
his claim. (R. at 17.) Following the hearing, the ALJ held
the record open and requested that Plaintiff attend a
psychological consultative examination. (R. at 17.) This
examination took place on November 2, 2016, and was
administered by Dr. Michael Rabara. (R. at 17.) After
considering Dr. Rabara's report, the ALJ denied
Plaintiff's claim on July 17, 2017. (R. at 14-34.) The
Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review of
the ALJ's decision. (R. at 1-8.) On August 29, 2018,
Plaintiff filed this action seeking judicial review of the
denial. (Doc. 1.)
The
Court has reviewed the medical evidence in its entirety and
finds it unnecessary to provide a complete summary here. The
pertinent medical evidence will be discussed in addressing
the issues raised by the parties. In short, upon considering
the medical records and opinions, the ALJ evaluated
Plaintiff's disability based on the following severe
impairments: posttraumatic stress disorder; adjustment
disorder with mixed anxiety and depression; major depression
disorder; and unspecified trauma and stressor-related
disorder. (R. at 19.)[2]
Ultimately,
the ALJ evaluated the medical evidence and testimony and
concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled. (R. at 29.) The ALJ
found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to “perform a full range of work at
all exertional levels but with the following non-exertional
limitations: he is able to perform simple, routine tasks in
an environment with few changes and free from fast-paced
production requirements, like those found in assembly line
work.” (R. at 22.) The ALJ also found that Plaintiff
“requires redirection at the start of each shift and
after the lunch break” and that he “can have
occasional and superficial interaction with supervisors,
coworkers and the public, such that he can work in proximity
to, but not in tandem with, others.” (R. at 22.)
Finally, the ALJ concluded that “there are jobs that
exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the
[Plaintiff] can perform.” (R. at 27.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
The
Court addresses only the issues raised by the claimant in the
appeal from the ALJ's decision. Lewis v. Apfel,
236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). “The ALJ is
responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts
in medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities.”
Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir.
2001), as amended on reh'g (Aug. 9, 2001). The
Court should uphold the ALJ's decision “unless it
contains legal error or is not supported by substantial
evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630
(9th Cir. 2007). “Substantial evidence is more than a
mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.”
Id. Put another way, “[i]t is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted).
The Court should uphold the ALJ's decision “[w]here
evidence is susceptible to more than one rational
interpretation, ” but the Court “must consider
the entire record as a whole and may not affirm simply by
isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.”
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
“[H]armless
error principles apply in the Social Security Act
context.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104,
1115 (9th Cir. 2012). “[A]n ALJ's error is harmless
where it is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability
determination.” Id. (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court must “look at the
record as a whole to determine whether the error alters the
outcome of the case.” Id. Importantly,
however, the Court may not uphold an ALJ's decision on a
ground not actually relied on by the ALJ. Id. at
1121.
To
determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the
Social Security Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of
proof on the first four steps, and the burden shifts to the
Commissioner at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180
F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ
determines whether the claimant is engaging in substantial
gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so,
the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends.
Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the
claimant has a “severe” medically determinable
physical or mental impairment. Id. §
404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and
the inquiry ends. Id. At step three, the ALJ
considers whether the claimant's impairment or
combination of impairments meets or medically equals an
impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. pt.
404. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the
claimant is automatically found to be disabled. Id.
If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. At step four, the ALJ
assesses the claimant's residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) and determines whether the claimant is
capable of performing past relevant work. Id. §
404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not disabled and
the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to
the fifth and final step, which addresses whether the
claimant can perform any other work based on the
claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience.
Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is
not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled.
III.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff
raises a single argument for the Court's consideration:
the ALJ erred by assigning little weight to the opinion of
Dr. Rabara, Plaintiff's examining psychologist. (Pl. Br.
at 8-9.) The ALJ chose to give little weight to Dr.
Rabara's opinion because she concluded that (1) it was
“not consistent with the entirety of the record”
and (2) it was “internally inconsistent.” (R. at
25.) As explained below, the Court disagrees with
Plaintiff-the ALJ provided specific, legitimate reasons for
reaching these conclusions. Thus, the ALJ did not commit
reversible error by assigning little weight to Dr.
Rabara's opinion.
Although
“[t]he ALJ must consider all medical opinion evidence,
” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041
(9th Cir. 2008), there is a hierarchy among the sources of
medical opinions. Those who have treated a claimant are
treating physicians, those who examined but did not treat the
claimant are examining physicians, and those who neither
examined nor treated the claimant are nonexamining
physicians. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th
Cir. 1995).
Given
this hierarchy, an ALJ must provide clear and convincing
reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted opinion of an
examining physician. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d
1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995). In contrast, in an examining
physician's opinion is contradicted by the opinions of
other doctors (even non-examining doctors), a lesser standard
applies-an ALJ may reject such an ...