United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
G.
MURRAY SNOW CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
At
issue is the partial denial of Plaintiff Charles Jordan,
Jr.'s application for Title II disability insurance
benefits by Defendant Social Security Administration.
Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) seeking judicial review
of that denial, and the Court now considers Plaintiff's
Opening Brief (Doc. 20, “Pl. Br.”), the
Defendant's Response (Doc. 23, “Def. Br.”),
Plaintiff's Reply (Doc. 16), and the Administrative
Record (Doc. 17, “R.”). Because the Court finds
the decision free of legal error and supported by substantial
evidence, it affirms.
I.
BACKGROUND[1]
Plaintiff
filed applications for Title II disability insurance benefits
and Title XVI supplement security income on November 30, 2015
for a period of disability beginning October 1, 2014. (R. at
16.) The applications were denied initially on March 21,
2016, and upon reconsideration on August 30, 2016. (R. at
16.) Plaintiff requested a hearing which was held on April
24, 2018 before an administrative law judge
(“ALJ”). (R. at 16.) On June 11, 2018, the ALJ
issued her decision finding Plaintiff disabled as of March 6,
2017 (R. at 15-28), which was upheld by the Appeals Council
on August 13, 2018 (R. at 1-3).
In
finding the Plaintiff not disabled prior to March 6, 2017,
the ALJ relied on the opinions of a consultative examiner,
Dr. James Huddleston, and reviewing psychological consultants
who each opined that Plaintiff was capable of work consisting
of “simple and some detailed tasks” and
“limited contact with the public and coworkers.”
(R. at 23-24.) She rejected the opinion of Plaintiff's
treating physician, Dr. Donald Holland. (R. at 25.) The
ALJ's later finding of disability as of March 6, 2017 was
supported by the opinion of Plaintiff's treating
physician, Dr. Ivan Engel, who opined that Plaintiff would be
off task greater than 21% of an eight-hour workday, and the
testimony of a vocational expert, who opined that an
individual with the Plaintiff's limitations who would be
off task for at least 16% of the workday would be precluded
from all work. (R. at 25, 58-59.)
Plaintiff
brings this appeal alleging that the ALJ committed various
legal errors in finding him disabled as of March 6,
2017.[2] (Pl. Br. at 1.) Plaintiff proffers a
number of arguments as to why the ALJ's decision should
be reversed, many of which raise common legal issues which
are addressed below.
This
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
In
determining whether to reverse an ALJ's decision, the
district court reviews only those issues raised by the party
challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236
F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court may set aside
the Commissioner's disability determination only if the
determination is not supported by substantial evidence or is
based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625,
630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a
scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is relevant
evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion considering the record as a whole.
Id. To determine whether substantial evidence
supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a
whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a
“specific quantum of supporting evidence.”
Id. As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence
is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one
of which supports the ALJ's decision, the ALJ's
conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v.
Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted).
To
determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the
Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of proof on the
first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner
at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098
(9th Cir. 1999).[3]
III.
ANALYSIS
A.
The ALJ properly considered medical opinion
evidence.
An ALJ
must evaluate every medical opinion in the record. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c). The general rule is that the greatest
evidentiary weight is given to opinions of treating
physicians; lesser weight is given to opinions of
non-treating, examining physicians; and the least weight is
given to opinions of non-treating, non-examining physicians.
See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012; see also 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). Opinions of treating physicians
are entitled to the greatest weight because a treating
physician “is employed to cure and has a greater
opportunity to know and observe the patient as an
individual.” Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226,
1230 (9th Cir. 1987); see also 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(2). In assessing how much weight to give any
medical opinion, the ALJ considers: the length, nature, and
extent of the treatment relationship (if any); the frequency
of examination (if any); the extent to which the opinion is
supported by medical signs and laboratory findings; the
consistency of the medical with the record as a whole; the
physician's specialization; and “other
factors.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-
404.1527(c)(6).
If a
conflict exists between medical opinions, the ALJ must
resolve it. Morgan, 169 F.3d at 601. If the ALJ
assigns lesser weight to a controverted opinion of a treating
or examining physician, the ALJ must articulate
“specific and legitimate reasons supported by
substantial evidence.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830.
An ALJ may reject “the opinion of any physician,
including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief,
conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical
findings.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957; see
Batson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190,
1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming rejection of a treating
physician's opinion that “was in the form of a
checklist, did not have supportive objective evidence, was
contradicted by other statements and assessments of
[claimant's] medical condition, and was based on
[claimant's] subjective descriptions of pain”). An
ALJ satisfies the “substantial evidence”
requirement by providing a “detailed and thorough
summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence,
stating his [or her] interpretation thereof, and ...