United States District Court, D. Arizona
ORDER
Honorable James A. Soto, United States District Judge
Pending
before the Court are several motions in limine filed by
Plaintiffs and Defendant; the motions are addressed
below.[1]
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs
John Guido and Dennis Rankin began working for Defendant
Mount Lemmon Fire District (“Fire
District”)[2] in 2000. The position each held was
Firefighter EMT. In 2005, both Guido and Rankin were promoted
to the rank of Fire Captain. On June 15, 2009, Guido and
Rankin were laid off; Rankin was 54 years old and Guido was
46 years old when they were laid off. The person who
terminated them, Fire Chief Barnella, was in his thirties at
the time of these terminations. At the time of the lay offs,
Guido and Rankin were the oldest full-time employees of the
Fire District.
On July
28, 2009, Guido and Rankin each filed a Charge of
Discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission alleging that Defendant discriminated against them
on the basis of age. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint
in this case alleging that they were terminated in violation
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”) which prohibits discrimination
against employees 40 and older on the basis of their
age.[3]
See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a).[4]
ADMISSIBILITY
STANDARDS
As
pertinent to the motions in limine, Fed.R.Evid. 402 provides:
"Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the
following provides otherwise: • the United States
Constitution; • a federal statute; • these rules;
or • other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.
Irrelevant evidence is not admissible." Fed.R.Evid. 401
defines relevant evidence as follows: "Evidence is
relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or
less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b)
the fact is of consequence in determining the action."
Fed.R.Evid. 403 provides that: “The court may exclude
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury,
undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.” As to experts, Fed.R.Evid. 702
states that “[a]witness who is qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may
testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the
expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony
is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is
the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the
expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the
facts of the case.”
DISCUSSION:
MOTIONS IN LIMINE
Doc.
113: Mary Jo O'Neill's Testimony
Defendant's
motion in limine to preclude Mary Jo O'Neill from
testifying as a fact and expert witness is unopposed by
Plaintiffs (see Doc. 128); this unopposed motion
(Doc. 113) is granted.
Doc.
114: Charges of Discrimination, EEOC's
Investigation/Findings
Defendant
seeks to preclude Plaintiff from presenting any evidence
regarding their Charges of Discrimination submitted to the
EEOC, the EEOC's investigation into their Charges, the
EEOC's determination letters regarding its investigation,
and its Notice of Right to Sue letters as it argues that the
evidence is irrelevant and any probative value is
substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice
and confusion. Defendant argues that such evidence is
irrelevant inasmuch as the EEOC process used different
standards, it was not a true confrontational process with
witnesses subject to cross-examination under oath, and the
jury would give undue weight to the EEOC's
determinations.
As a
threshold matter, Plaintiff does not intend to use at trial,
and does not oppose preclusion of: the EEOC's 1/29/13
letters to Plaintiff and the EEOC's right to sue letters.
As such, these letters are precluded at trial.
However,
Plaintiffs argue that Ninth Circuit case law reflects that
the other EEOC evidence at issue is relevant, the relevance
outweighs Rule 403 considerations, and it could be error to
preclude such evidence. See Plummer v. Western Intern.
Hotels Co., Inc., 656 F.2d 502, 504-505 (9th Cir. 1981)
(“[I]t is reversible error for a trial court to strike
an EEOC determination from a Title VII complaint . . . [T]he
Commission's Determination of Probable Cause was
admissible evidence in a trial de novo on [plaintiff's]
claim . . . [W]hile prior administrative determinations are
not binding, they are admissible evidence . . . An EEOC
determination, prepared by professional investigators on
behalf of an impartial agency, has been held to be a highly
probative evaluation of an individual's discrimination
complaint.”). While the Court has the discretion to
preclude the EEOC evidence at issue based on Rule 403
considerations, [5] the Court finds that its relevance
outweighs Rule 403 concerns; the Court can give limiting
...