United States District Court, D. Arizona
MICHAEL T. LIBURDI, UNITED STALES DISTRICT JUDGE
Edward Lee Jones, Sr., who is currently confined in the
Arizona State Prison Complex-Eyman, filed a pro se civil
rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before
the Court is a Motion entitled “Plaintiff's
Emergency Motions for Injunction against the Arizona
Department of Corrections officials/staff at SMU-1”
(Doc. 106), which Plaintiff filed in four pending
Court will deny the Motion filed in this action.
screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court
determined that Plaintiff stated Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act and First Amendment free speech
and free exercise claims in Counts One through Eight against
Defendants Ryan, McWilliams, Lauchner, Slade, Olson, Reese,
Miller and Mattson and required those Defendants to answer
the claims against them as set forth in the screening Order.
(Docs. 18, 63.)
Motion for Injunctive Relief
“Emergency Motions for Injunction” filed on
November 21, 2019, Plaintiff requests an order from the Court
ordering Sergeant Harris to “provide all of
Plaintiff's legal boxes/legal books, for ADC to be
directed not to take Plaintiff's legal boxes/legal books,
. . . [and] for SMU1 officials to provide Plaintiff with
indigent hygiene and access to proper forms to exhaust the
grievance process.” (Doc. 106 at 1.)
complains that between July 23, 2019 and November 7, 2019,
“staff” at Rynning unit provided him
“indigent” supplies only four times.
(Id. at 2.) Plaintiff asserts that “in the
last 12 months, ” Sergeant Harris and his subordinates
have lost or wrongfully destroyed Plaintiff's property.
(Id. at 2-3.) Plaintiff asserts that despite
multiple requests, staff will not return his legal property
and as a result he has been unable to respond to motions
filed in this case and in CV 18-4872. (Id. at 4.)
Plaintiff appears to say that he has not been able to respond
to Defendant Mattson's Motion to Dismiss at Doc. 101.
(See id.) Plaintiff also states that
“[p]risoners are being hindered from the grievance
process..” (Id. at 5.)
respond that Plaintiff arrived at ASPC-Eyman-SMU-1 on
November 7, 2019 and received his property by no later than
December 4, 2019. (Doc. 110 at 2.) Plaintiff had 6 legal
boxes in his property, but prisoners are only allowed 3 boxes
in their living area at any one time, and the excess boxes
were placed in storage. (Id.) Plaintiff may request
to exchange boxes from his housing area to receive boxes from
storage, but Sergeant Harris has not received any written
requests from Plaintiff for a legal box exchange.
(Id.) Plaintiff did not file a reply or respond to
Defendants' assertion that he had not requested to
exchange his legal boxes.
preliminary injunction is ‘an extraordinary and drastic
remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by
a clear showing, carries the burden of
persuasion.'” Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d
1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Mazurek v.
Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam);
see also Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted) (“[a]
preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never
awarded as of right”). A plaintiff seeking a
preliminary injunction must show that (1) he is likely to
succeed on the merits, (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable
harm without an injunction, (3) the balance of equities tips
in his favor, and (4) an injunction is in the public
interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. “But if a
plaintiff can only show that there are ‘serious
questions going to the merits'-a lesser showing than
likelihood of success on the merits-then a preliminary
injunction may still issue if the ‘balance of hardships
tips sharply in the plaintiff's favor,' and the other
two Winter factors are satisfied.” Shell
Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1291
(9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Alliance for the Wild Rockies v.
Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011)). Under
this serious questions variant of the Winter test,
“[t]he elements . . . must be balanced, so that a
stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing
of another.” Lopez, 680 F.3d at 1072.
of which standard applies, the movant “has the burden
of proof on each element of the test.” See Envtl.
Council of Sacramento v. Slater, 184 F.Supp.2d 1016,
1027 (E.D. Cal. 2000). Further, there is a heightened burden
where a plaintiff seeks a mandatory preliminary injunction,
which should not be granted “unless the facts and law
clearly favor the plaintiff.” Comm. of Cent. Am.
Refugees v. INS, 795 F.2d 1434, 1441 (9th Cir. 1986)
Prison Litigation Reform Act imposes additional requirements
on prisoner litigants who seek preliminary injunctive relief
against prison officials and requires that any injunctive
relief be narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means
necessary to correct the harm. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2);
see Gilmore v. People of the State of Cal, 220 F.3d
987, 999 (9th Cir. 2000).
may issue an injunction against a non-party only where the
non-party acts in active concert or participation with an
enjoined party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d)(2) (a preliminary
injunction only binds those who receive actual notice of it
by personal service or are parties, their officers, agents,
servants, employees, and attorneys, and persons in active
concert); see Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th
Cir. 1984) (“A federal court may issue an injunction if
it has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject
matter jurisdiction over the claim; it may not ...