Jones v. Davis

          ORDER

          MICHAEL T. LIBURDI, UNITED SLATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Plaintiff Edward Lee Jones, Sr., who is currently confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex-Eyman, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court is a Motion entitled “Plaintiff's Emergency Motions for Injunction against the Arizona Department of Corrections officials/staff at SMU-1” (Doc. 24), which Plaintiff filed in four pending cases.^[1]

         The Court will deny the Motion filed in this action.

         I. Background

         On screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the Court determined that Plaintiff stated a First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Grievance Coordinator Rydgren based on Plaintiff's allegation that, in 2018, Rydgren charged Plaintiff with a disciplinary infraction in retaliation for Plaintiff filing grievances. (Doc. 9 at 11.) The Court dismissed the remaining claims and Defendants. (See generally, id.)

         II. Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint

         Defendant Rydgren filed an Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint on July 3, 2019. On October 1, 2019, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint without first seeking leave of the Court. Pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff may amend his Complaint only with the opposing party's written consent or with the Court's leave. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Moreover, this Court's local rule requires a party seeking leave to amend a complaint to file a motion to amend the complaint and to attach a copy of the proposed amended pleading “which must indicate in what respect it differs from the pleading which it amends, by bracketing or striking through the text to be deleted and underlining the text to be added.” LRCiv 15.1. Because Plaintiff did not properly comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or this Court's local rules prior to filing an Amended Complaint, the Court will direct the Clerk of the Court to strike the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 20.). Plaintiff's original Complaint (Doc. 10) remains the operative pleading in this action.

         III. Motion for Injunctive Relief

         In his “Emergency Motions for Injunction, ” Plaintiff requests an order from the Court ordering Sergeant Harris to “provide all of Plaintiff's legal boxes/legal books, for ADC to be directed not to take Plaintiff's legal boxes/legal books, . . . [and] for SMU1 officials to provide Plaintiff with indigent hygiene and access to proper forms to exhaust the grievance process.” (Doc. 24 at 1.)

         Plaintiff complains that between July 23, 2019 and November 7, 2019, “staff” at Rynning unit provided him “indigent” supplies only four times. (Id.at 2.) Plaintiff asserts that “in the last 12 months, ” Sergeant Harris and his subordinates have lost or wrongfully destroyed Plaintiff's property. (Id. at 2-3.) Plaintiff asserts that despite multiple requests, staff will not return his legal property and as a result he has been unable to respond to motions filed in CV 18-4872 and CV 18-1972. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff states that “[p]risoners are being hindered from the grievance process..” (Id. at 5.) . . . .

         A. Legal Standard

         “A preliminary injunction is ‘an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.'” Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam); see also Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted) (“[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right”). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must show that (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm without an injunction, (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. “But if a plaintiff can only show that there are ‘serious questions going to the merits'-a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the merits-then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the ‘balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff's favor,' and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.” Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011)). Under this serious questions variant of the Winter test, “[t]he elements . . . must be balanced, so that a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” Lopez, 680 F.3d at 1072.

         Regardless of which standard applies, the movant “has the burden of proof on each element of the test.” See Envtl. Council of Sacramento v. Slater, 184 F.Supp.2d 1016, 1027 (E.D. Cal. 2000). Further, there is a heightened burden where a plaintiff seeks a mandatory preliminary injunction, which should not be granted “unless the facts and law clearly favor the plaintiff.” Comm. of Cent. Am. Refugees v. INS, 795 F.2d 1434, 1441 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).

         The Prison Litigation Reform Act imposes additional requirements on prisoner litigants who seek preliminary injunctive relief against prison officials and requires that any injunctive relief be narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means necessary to correct the harm. 18 U.S.C. § ...