Searching over 5,500,000 cases.

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Gastelum v. Canyon Hospitality LLC

United States District Court, D. Arizona

May 25, 2018

Fernando Gastelum, Plaintiff,
Canyon Hospitality LLC, Defendant.


          Honorable G. Murray Snow, Judge.

         Pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Canyon Hospitality, LLC for lack of standing. (Doc. 12). Recently, in Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center v. Hospitality Properties Trust, 867 F.3d 1093, 1099 (9th Cir. 2017) (hereinafter “CREEC”), the Ninth Circuit restated and clarified the broad scope of standing in ADA cases involving public accommodations as it relates both to the deterrent effect doctrine and to tester standing. Plaintiff has filed 133 similar cases against hotels in the Phoenix area. Because the issue of standing affects all of Plaintiff's cases before the Court, the Court ordered a consolidated hearing at which the Court could consider Mr. Gastelum's standing in all his cases then pending before this Court. In addition to the Canyon Hospitality case, Mr. Gastelum had eleven other ADA complaints against hotels pending in this Court. The hearing held was noticed for ten of them.[1]After reviewing the evidence from the hearing, the Court determines that Plaintiff nevertheless fails to meet the requirements for standing in every case. Thus, the Court grants Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and enters this Order dismissing both the Canyon Hospitality case and all other cases brought by Plaintiff that were the noticed subject of the motion hearing.


         Plaintiff Fernando Gastelum's left leg is amputated below the knee, requiring him to move around either with a prosthetic leg or the aid of a wheelchair. He spends approximately 85% of his time in a wheelchair. In his Complaint, [2] as it pertains to his interaction with Defendant Canyon Hospitality's hotel, Plaintiff merely alleges that “on or about August 17, 2017” “Plaintiff reviewed a 3rd party lodging website to book an ambulatory and wheelchair accessible room.” (Doc. 1, pp. 15, 26, 30). According to Plaintiff, this website did not contain sufficient information for Plaintiff to determine whether Defendant's hotel complied with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-89. (Doc. 1, p. 5). Next, Plaintiff visited Defendant's first-party website,, attempting to find the information that was not available on the third-party website. Plaintiff found that the first-party website also lacked enough detail on ADA compliance. Id. at p. 8. Because he could not ascertain from the websites whether the hotel complied with the ADA, he thereafter called Defendant's hotel to inquire whether it was ADA compliant and was assured by an employee, Rena, that it was. Id. at pp. 33-35. Nevertheless, on August 18, 2017, Plaintiff visited Defendant's hotel to verify in person whether the hotel was ADA compliant and suitable for Plaintiff to stay.

         In his visit to this Defendant, Plaintiff noted 22 areas where Defendant's external facilities were allegedly out of compliance with the ADA. Id. at pp. 10-12. That same day, August 18, 2017, Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit seeking injunctive relief under the ADA. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff does not state in his Complaint how any of the failures of compliance discriminate against him or his disability, but the Complaint does make the bare allegation that he “intends to book a room at the Defendant's hotel once Defendant has removed all accessibility barriers.” (Doc. 1, pp. 16, 19, 30). On that same date, Plaintiff also filed a separate complaint concerning a separate hotel with virtually identical allegations. See Gastelum v. BRE/LQ Properties LLC, No. 17-cv-02802-PHX-DGC (D. Ariz. filed Aug. 18, 2017).

         At the time of the filing of Defendant Canyon Hospitality's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff had, in the previous six weeks, filed over thirty-three ADA complaints against hotels in the Phoenix area alleging that he has been personally harmed by the ADA violations of those hotels. By the time the hearing was held on this matter Plaintiff acknowledged that he has filed a total of approximately 125 similar lawsuits in the District of Arizona against various hotels in the Phoenix area. At present, Plaintiff has apparently filed 133 lawsuits. He has continued to file such suits after the hearing.[3] The complaints filed in all the cases pending in front of this Court are substantially similar, boilerplate complaints. In all the complaints, Mr. Gastelum alleges the same process of checking a third-party website, then a first-party website, and finally an in-person visit. If the websites make different levels of disclosure of ADA accommodations, the complaints reflect the specific disclosures, seemingly copied and pasted from the website. See, e.g., Gastelum v. AUM Hospitality Ventures, LLC, No. 18-cv-0104-PHX-GMS (D. Ariz. filed Jan. 11, 2018) (Doc. 1, pp. 9-10). All of the complaints contain the same language that Mr. Gastelum “intends to book a room at the Defendant's hotel once Defendant has removed all accessibility barriers.” See, e.g., Id. at p. 4. No complaint contains further detail on Mr. Gastelum's return plans. Each complaint contains a different list of ADA barriers found on Plaintiff's inspection, though many of the same barriers appear on each complaint. Thus, while details gleamed from the inspections are changed, the substance of the rest of the complaints are almost exactly the same.

         Defendant Canyon Hospitality operates the Grand Canyon University Hotel in Phoenix, and moved the Court to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to plead the necessary requirements to establish Article III standing. (Doc. 12). In light of the questions raised by Defendant in its motion that were similar to virtually all of the cases filed by Mr. Gastelum in this Court, and the Court's obligation to sua sponte determine whether there is standing in its cases, see Bernhardt v. County of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 2001), the Court held evidentiary hearings on May 4, 2018 and May 11, 2018 that pertained to all of the cases filed by Mr. Gastelum that were being heard by this Court.

         Mr. Gastelum was present to testify on both occasions. Mr. Gastelum testified that he lives in Casa Grande, Arizona, approximately fifty-five miles from Phoenix, Arizona. He is 57 years old and has lived in Casa Grande all of his life. Mr. Gastelum testified that since he began to file ADA lawsuits against lodgings in the Phoenix area last year he has stayed overnight at ten hotels. He never stayed in the same hotel twice. Mr. Gastelum sued each of these ten hotels for failure to comply with the ADA.[4] He testified that he has not returned to any of the hotels with which he has settled his claims, or in which he has stayed, because they have not yet completed their compliance with all ADA standards. In addition to staying at the ten lodgings, he has paid visits within the past year to many other Phoenix area lodgings to assess whether they comply with the ADA. Inspecting hotels for ADA compliance in the company of his attorney is one of the principal reasons that he comes to Phoenix: Mr. Gastelum meets with his attorney, Mr. Peter Strojnik, in Phoenix, twice a week. Mr. Gastelum's son, Eric, who receives compensation for the inspection of the hotels, and Mr. Strojnik himself generally accompany Mr. Gastelum to the hotels. In fact, Mr. Gastelum stated in a deposition that he usually stays in the car while Eric and Mr. Strojnik inspect the hotel.[5] Gastelum v. Pride Hospitality, No. 17-cv-03607-PHX-GMS (D. Ariz. filed Oct. 8, 2017) (Doc. 27, Ex. 1, p. 106:10-16). Mr. Gastelum testified that he had been given a three-ring binder prepared by his counsel Mr. Strojnik[6] which contains materials and instruction by which he can ascertain whether a lodging is in compliance with all ADA regulations. He takes the binder with him when he visits those lodgings. If the lodging is out of compliance with the ADA, Mr. Strojnik files suit on his behalf. Mr. Gastelum estimates that he visits four Phoenix-area hotels a week, usually two per day. But he generally returns to Casa Grande for the evening without staying at any of the Phoenix lodgings that he has visited. In addition to bringing suit against each of the ten lodgings at which he actually stayed during the past year, he has brought suit against more than 120 other facilities that he has visited or otherwise contacted to evaluate for ADA compliance. And as the facts of some of the cases demonstrate, the lawsuit is at least sometimes filed on the same date as Mr. Gastelum's visit. At the hearing, Mr. Gastelum testified that it was his intent and desire in bringing these suits to represent all persons with disabilities in asserting their rights to ADA compliance, and that he had a general desire to live in communities and stay at lodgings that accommodated persons with disabilities as full members of the community.

         As has been discussed, an examination of the Complaints in these lawsuits reveals that the Complaints are boilerplate complaints that have identical language in many particulars and are minimally tailored to accommodate the facts of the individual lodging defendant. Mr. Gastelum has not personally paid the filing fees for any of the cases brought. His attorney covers the filing fee. The amount of filing fees alone paid to file the suits in the last year exceeds Mr. Gastelum's yearly household income of $44, 000.[7]His wife is employed and works a regular work week from Monday to Friday. In his deposition in the Pride Hospitality case, Mr. Gastelum testified that his wife of over twenty years is unaware that he is a plaintiff in ADA cases and that he frequently travels to Phoenix with his son to investigate hotels and meet with his attorney. No. 17-cv-03607-PHX-GMS (Doc. 27, Ex. 1, pp. 26:6-27:4).

         Mr. Gastelum's counsel has already settled 6 of the suits that were filed in this Court for undisclosed sums. Mr. Gastelum is paid $350 for every case that is successfully terminated by his counsel. Pride Hospitality, No. 17-cv-03607-PHX-GMS (Doc. 27, Ex. 1, pp. 173:24-174:10). In two of the cases that are currently before this Court the parties have resolved the underlying matters but have asked the Court to award attorneys' fees to Mr. Gastelum's counsel as representing the prevailing party. In both cases, Mr. Gastelum's counsel has quickly settled the case against the Defendants and then sought attorney's fees and costs awards of $21, 291 and $12, 643, respectively, without doing any substantial discovery in the case. Pride Hospitality, No. 17-cv-03607-PHX-GMS (Doc. 22); AUM Hospitality Ventures LLC, No. 18-cv-00104-PHX-GMS (Doc. 15).

         Mr. Gastelum stated that he likes to come to Phoenix to attend baseball games, and to go to karaoke bars and shopping with his wife, and meet with his attorney. Mr. Gastelum filed an evidentiary memorandum with the court, prior to the first hearing. In the evidentiary memorandum he provided receipts from all of the hotels at which he has stayed and all of the sporting events he attended in Phoenix in the last year. The sporting events are for Diamondback games together with two football related events. (Doc. 28). To the extent that Mr. Gastelum attempts to suggest that he stays overnight in Phoenix when he attends Diamondbacks games, the receipts and dates of the tickets demonstrates that he does not. The dates he has stayed in lodgings in the Phoenix in the last year do not coincide with dates on which he was attending Diamondbacks games, and he provides no corroboration that he stayed with his wife on such occasions when shopping or going to karaoke with her.

         Prior to the time he began initiating these lawsuits, Mr. Gastelum generally returned to Casa Grande for the night when he had business in Phoenix, or he stayed with his friend who lived in Phoenix or with his sister who lives in Mesa. He believed he had stayed at hotels in the Phoenix area approximately ten other times in his life during all of which he has resided in Casa Grande. On his family's household income--$44, 000 per annum--Mr. Gastelum estimated that he would be able to stay in hotels in the Phoenix area a maximum of twelve to fifteen times per year. Mr. Gastelum stated that it would be impossible to stay at all of the approximately 125 (now 133) hotels he has sued, but he would like to stay at some.[8] He testified that he would return to and stay at any of the hotels he has sued if the alleged ADA violations were fixed.

         Mr. Gastelum has never before visited Defendant Canyon Hospitality, nor has he since visited. Nor at the hearing was he able to set forth any persuasive reasons why he is likely to visit the Defendant Canyon Hospitality in the future. The Court finds that although Mr. Gastelum did visit the Defendant's facility as a tester, he did so only with the purpose of filing a lawsuit to obtain injunctive relief as a part of pattern of litigation against many Phoenix area hotels. He has offered no sufficiently persuasive reason to believe that he would revisit the facility, or any other facility in the cases for which the hearing was noted, except to the extent that such a revisitation or an avowal of willingness to revisit would be necessary to maintain standing to obtain injunctive relief.

         Mr. Gastelum did identify a few generalized reasons why he might want to return to other hotels he has sued, including, for example, their proximity to water parks or malls. But he offered no reasonable plans to believe that he had any specific intent or likelihood of doing so. Further, Mr. Gastelum has sued 133 hotels in the Phoenix area and avowed in doing so that he intended to book a room at each one of them once the defendant resolved its ADA issues. However, Mr. Gastelum testified that he has never stayed at a hotel more than once.

         In his verified complaints Mr. Gastelum does not avow that he would actually return to any of the facilities against which he is bringing suit, only that he would “book a room” in such facilities. In none of the complaints does Mr. Gastelum allege a specific persuasive reason why he would return to the lodging he sues. Because of the volume of cases he has brought, his limited reasons for staying in Phoenix, the proximity to Casa Grande to which he easily can, and frequently does, return for his overnight stays, the evident enterprise in conjunction with his attorney to sue many hotels in the Phoenix area for ADA compliance, his personal finances, his past travel habits, and his testimony that he could not return to all hotels he has sued, the Court finds that he has failed to establish a sufficient likelihood that he would return to any of the hotels that are the defendants in the cases in which this hearing is noticed.

         Based upon the above facts the Court concludes that Mr. Gastelum and his counsel Mr. Strojnik are engaged in a joint enterprise in which they are filing multiple suits against any Phoenix area lodgings that they believe to be out of compliance with the ADA in some respect or respects. They are filing such suits without reference to whether Mr. Gastelum actually had any intent to make future visits to those facilities for reasons not related to his pursuit of ADA claims against them. Given the facts of this case Mr. Gastelum has failed to establish that he would have any likelihood of revisiting these facilities except to the extent it would be deemed necessary for him to do so to bring suit against each of the Defendants.


         I. Legal Standard

         Standing under Article III of the Constitution is a constitutional limitation on a court's subject matter jurisdiction and cannot be granted by statute. See Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576-77 (1992)). Because standing is a jurisdictional question, it is properly addressed in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion instead of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1174. “A district court may hear evidence and make findings of fact necessary to rule on the subject matter jurisdiction question prior to trial, if the jurisdictional facts are not intertwined with the merits.” Rosales v. United States, 824 F.2d 799, 803 (9th Cir. 1987).

         II. Analysis

         The Constitution requires that litigants “who seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts must satisfy the threshold requirements imposed by Article III . . . by alleging an actual case or controversy.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983). This Constitutional prerequisite of standing is so fundamental that federal courts are required to consider these issues sua sponte. See Bernhardt, 279 F.3d at 868. Three elements must be present for a Plaintiff to have standing: (1) the Plaintiff must have “suffered an injury in fact-an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;” (2) there must be a “causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of;” and (3) it must be “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. When a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, there is an additional requirement of showing “a sufficient likelihood that [the plaintiff] will again be wronged in a similar way . . . [t]hat is, . . . a real and immediate threat of repeated injury.” Fortyune v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111, and O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496 (1974)) (internal quotations omitted). In the context of civil rights statutes, such as the ADA, courts are instructed to take a “broad view” of constitutional standing. Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972)).

         But, Congress “cannot erase Article III's standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S.811, 820 n. 3 (1997). As such, “Congress' role in identifying and elevating intangible harms does not mean that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robbins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016). ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.